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Second thoughts about the anthropology of Islam, or 
how to make sense of grand schemes in everyday life
Samuli Schielke, Zentrum Moderner Orient
 
Abstract
A growing body of anthropological research has 
turned to study Islam as a discursive tradition that 
informs the attempts of Muslims to live pious and 
moral lives, the aﬀ ects and emotions they cultiva-
te and the challenges they pose to a liberal secular 
ideology. While this turn has provided direction for 
a number of innovative studies, it appears to stop 
short of some key questions regarding everyday re-
ligious and moral practice, notably the ambivalence, 
the inconsistencies and the openness of people’s 
lives that never fi t into the framework of a single tra-
dition. In short, there is too much Islam in the anth-
ropology of Islam. To fi nd ways to account for both 
the ambivalence of people’s everyday lives and the 
often perfectionist ideals of good life, society and 
self they articulate, I argue that we may have to talk 
a little less about traditions, discourses and powers 
and a little more about the existential and pragmatic 
sensibilities of living a life in a complex and often 
troubling world. By broadening our focus to include 
the concerns, practice and experience of everyday 
life in its various moments and directions, we may 
eventually also be better able to make sense of the 
signifi cance of a grand scheme like Islam in it.
Keywords
anthropology, Islam, discursive tradition, secula-
rism, everyday life
Introduction1
Islam has become a central topic for the anthropo-
logical (and other) study of people, societies, tradi-
tions and concepts that in one way or another can 
be called Muslim. Studies of political movements, 
education, morality, migration and diaspora and 
many other issues have become increasingly em-
bedded in a paradigm of Islamic-ness, with publi-
cation titles over and again referring to »The role 
of Islam in...«, »Muslims in...«,»Islam and...« etc. 
Given the indeed great signifi cance of Islam in the 
lives of a great number of people around the world 
these days, this is not entirely past the point. We 
are well advised to take religion seriously and to 
avoid the pitfalls involved in reducing religious 
pursuits to economical or political ones (Starrett 
1998; Lambek 2000; Mahmood 2005). There is a 
problem of focus, however. This paper has grown 
out of a sense that the ways some infl uential recent 
1 This working paper is a slightly modifi ed version of a 
paper that was presented to the workshop »What makes a 
good Muslim? Complexities of moral practice and subjectiv-
ity in the age of global Islam« at the Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies in Helsinki, Finland on 16 April 2010, and 
the workshop of the Internationalisation Network »Confi gu-
rations of Muslim Traditions in European Public Spheres« at 
the Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin on 25 June 2010. I am 
especially indebted to Philipp Reichmuth, Knut Graw, Doro-
thea Schulz, Salwa Ismail, Michael Feener, Armando Sal-
vatore, Nadia Fadil, Alexandre Caeiro, Annelies Moors and 
Sindre Bangstad for their critical and helpful comments. I 
am also indebted to the DFG collaborative research centre 
295 (Cultural and Linguistic Contacts) at the University of 
Mainz, the research project »What makes a good Muslim: 
Contested fi elds of religious normativity in the age of global 
Islam« funded by the Academy of Finland at the University 
of Joensuu, the International Institute for the Study of Islam 
in the Modern World (ISIM) and last but not least the ZMO, 
which have at diﬀ erent times between 2006 and 2010 sup-
ported the research on which this paper is based.
©ZMO 2010
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to have one answer to the question about what Is-
lam is? After all, it can be rather diﬀ erent things 
depending on the questions we ask. This is not to 
join the argument that there are many »Islams«. 
What I mean is that Islam, like any major faith, is 
not simply something – it is a part of people’s lives, 
thoughts, acts, societies, histories and more. Con-
sequently, it can be many diﬀ erent things – a moral 
idiom, a practice of self-care, a discursive traditi-
on, an aesthetic sensibility, a political ideology, a 
mystical quest, a source of hope, a cause of anxie-
ty, an identity, an enemy – you name it. The second 
part of an explanation, then, is that there is too 
much Islam in the sense that the anthropology of 
Islam has a preoccupation with defi ning its fi eld of 
study, a preoccupation that may not be very help-
ful for understanding the signifi cance of Islam as 
a part of people’s lives.
These two peculiarities are both related to the 
way »Islam« in the anthropology of Islam has become 
more than a just a subject matter. The privileging 
of Islam as the key to the lives of people of Muslim 
faith allows »Islam« to emerge as a class of its own, 
a paradigm of study that is attractive and accessible 
for a growing body of graduate courses, PhD theses, 
funding applications and research papers. The anth-
ropology of Islam appears to have become more than 
simply a sub-fi eld of the anthropology of religion 
that has its focus on Islam. The anthropology of Is-
lam is a project concerned with methodological de-
bates of its own, guided by a sense about Islam not 
only being a religion diﬀ erent from, say, Hinduism, 
but a diﬀ erent kind of an issue altogether, one that 
requires a disciplinary approach of its own.
In this process, two key topics have emerged as 
guiding paradigms of much of the recent anthro-
pological study of Islam: the concept of Islam as a 
discursive tradition, and a focus on the cultivation 
of moral aﬀ ect grounded in that tradition. These to-
pics have provided direction for a number of inno-
vative studies that often share a focus on Muslims 
who consciously and consistently aim to be pious, 
moral and disciplined, their debates about how to 
do so, the challenges they face and the challenges 
they pose to a liberal secular ideology of subjecti-
vity and normativity. Some of this research is very 
good and has provided signifi cant progress for our 
theoretical understanding of embodiment, power 
and ideology. The problem with this line of studies, 
however, is that they are somewhat out of balan-
ce. There is a certain tendency to project Islam 
as a perfectionist ethical project of self-discipline, 
at the cost of the majority of Muslims who – like 
most of humankind – are sometimes but not always 
pious and who follow various moral aims and at 
times immoral ones. The ideals and aspirations 
people express and the everyday lives they live are 
characterised by complexity, ambiguity, refl ectivi-
ty, openness, frustration and tragedy. They argue 
for discipline at times and for freedom at others, 
anthropological research has taken »Islam« as the 
Archimedean point to study the lives of people who 
in one way or another adhere to the message of Mu-
hammad privileges a conceptual engagement with 
the Islamic-ness of its subjects in a way that needs 
to be balanced. To put it more provocatively, there 
is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam.
This requires some explanation. Too much Islam 
in what respect? Isn’t the anthropology of Islam, 
after all, about Islam? I think that this seemingly 
straightforward assumption may actually be part 
of the problem. To explain what I mean, I will try 
to briefl y point out two peculiarities that characte-
rise many anthropologies of Islam.
First, ethnographies about the religious lives of 
Muslims often privilege people who consciously 
present themselves as pious, committed Muslims 
and who participate in the activities of religious 
groups and organisations – in other words, people 
who share a sense of activist commitment. This is 
not to say that it is not important to look at de-
dicated activists. It certainly is. But most people 
are not dedicated activists. Focussing on the very 
pious in moments when they are being very pious 
(in mosque study groups, for example) risks taking 
those moments when people talk about religion as 
religious persons (at diﬀ erent times, they can talk 
about very diﬀ erent things and enact rather diﬀ e-
rent sides of their personality) as the paradigmatic 
ones, and thus unwittingly reproducing the parti-
cular ideological aspiration of Islamist and Islamic 
revivalist movements: the privileging of Islam as 
the supreme guideline of all fi elds of life.
It is evident that in many places, defi nitely so in 
Egypt where I have conducted my fi eldwork, adhe-
rence to Islam really is very important for people, 
and has become more so in the past couple of de-
cades. This is something that needs to be recog-
nised and accounted for. But in many ethnogra-
phies of Muslims’ lives there has emerged a more 
far-reaching way to a priori privilege the Muslim-
ness of the people involved and the Islamic-ness 
of the projects they pursue. This, then, is the fi rst 
part of an explanation: There is too much Islam in 
the anthropology of Islam in the sense of a lack of 
balance between the emphasis on religious com-
mitment and a not always suﬃ  cient account of the 
lives of which it is a part.
Second, there is a peculiar preoccupation with 
the question as to what Islam is. In recent years, 
many of my colleagues have been highlighting that 
they study Islam as a discursive tradition. As a PhD 
student, this was one of the fi rst things I learned 
in the staﬀ  seminars of our institute. Meanwhile, 
I have come to fi nd it rather peculiar that people 
fi nd it necessary in the fi rst place to state what 
they think Islam is. The anthropology of Christia-
nity, in comparison, appears much less preoccup-
ied with the question as to what kind of object of 
study Christianity is. Why, then, would we need 
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I open the enquiry with a more theoretical dis-
cussion of two key issues, fi rst, the search to un-
derstand what Islam »is«, and second, the current 
turn to a study of Islam through the notions of tradi-
tion, ethics and piety in juxtaposition with secular 
and liberal powers. I then return to the everyday 
world that is the site of my fi eldwork in Egypt in 
order to point out some key issues that I see as 
helpful for reaching a better understanding about 
what it actually means to live a life that, among 
other things, can be a Muslim life.
What Islam »is«
Many of the fi rst and groundbreaking anthropolo-
gical approaches to Islam between the 1960’s and 
80’s tried to explain what Islam actually is. The 
answers – the blueprint of a social order (Gellner 
1981), or the locally embedded specifi c version of 
a greater symbolic order (Geertz 1968) or a multi-
tude of culturally specifi c »Islams« (El-Zein 1977) 
were unsatisfactory (see Asad 1986; Varisco 2005; 
Marranci 2008). Interestingly, some of the best 
works from this period did not even try to explain 
what Islam is; instead they oﬀ ered some good ac-
counts about what it means to live as a Muslim in 
a specifi c historical and cultural situation  (e.g. 
Gilsenan 2000 [1982]; Abu-Lughod 1996 [1986]). 
Since then, however, Talal Asad (1986) has come 
up with a very powerful solution that has helped to 
fortify the question about what Islam is as a stan-
dard part of teaching, PhD theses, and theoretical 
sections of research papers.
According to Asad, Islam is a discursive tradi-
tion created by the generations of Muslims deba-
ting the correct form of practice with a view to its 
past, present and future. While extremely popular 
among anthropologists, this view has not remai-
ned uncontested. For example, Gabriele Marran-
ci (2008) has argued that Islam is essentially an 
emotional category, that Islam is about the feeling 
of being a Muslim. But this is not the key point for 
me. What concerns me is the question what it is 
about Islam that it makes it so important to under-
stand what it »is«? Why is it not suﬃ  cient to say 
that Islam is a religion? Asad has a good theoreti-
cal point against the study of Islam as a religion: 
the category of »religion« in the social sciences, he 
points out, is the outcome of a very specifi c Euro-
pean development in Christianity and carries the 
very likely risk of levelling the specifi c features of 
religious traditions around the world – notably the 
Muslim notion of dîn (religion), which is both vas-
ter and narrower than the social scientifi c cate-
gory (Asad 1993). Vaster because it involves many 
more fi elds of life, and narrower because it is a 
normative notion. There is a very common assump-
tion among Muslims that dîn is a true religion re-
vealed by God, including Islam, Christianity and 
Judaism, but excluding Hinduism, Buddhism Baha-
ism, etc. From this point of view, an anthropology 
but often live lives that lack both. If we want to ac-
count for the signifi cance of Islam in people’s lives, 
we have to account for it in this wider context.
In this paper I argue for an existential and ethno-
graphic approach that accounts for the motivations, 
experiences, complexities and ambiguities of eve-
ryday lives. To understand the complex logic of 
lived experience, we will have to take the inherent 
ambiguity of people’s lives as the starting point, 
just as we have to locate their world-views in both 
the local contexts they are physically acting in as 
well as the global connections, both imagined and 
enacted, they locate themselves in. These are not 
merely exceptions from some kind of normality; 
on the contrary they are the normality of people’s 
lives – even those who at times argue for holistic 
and perfectionist ideologies.
My critique is empirical and methodological 
more than it is theoretical, and so are the sugges-
tions I present at the end of this paper. What con-
cerns me is the question how we can study and 
understand people’s lives in a way that credits 
the importance of religious and other traditions, 
ideologies and expectations without losing sight of 
the complexities of life experience, the powers to 
which people are subjected and the active reima-
gination and reinvention of traditions and ideolo-
gies that constantly takes place in everyday life.
With this critique I take issue especially with 
a research programme that has become very pro-
ductive and infl uential in recent years. Characte-
rised by the keywords piety, ethics and discursive 
tradition, this research programme is often associ-
ated with the work of Talal Asad and his infl uential 
intervention in the Anthropology of Islam (1986). 
My critique is not, however, directed at the work 
of Asad and his concept of Islam as a discursive 
tradition. It is a good concept, and while I do have 
certain reservations about it  (Schielke 2007), I do 
not intend to be involved in a conceptual critique 
here. What I am interested in here is not concepts 
as such but what is accomplished through them.
Instead, I wish to oﬀ er some points of – hopeful-
ly constructive – criticism about what has been ac-
complished by a much wider research programme 
that has taken discursive tradition as its keyword. 
This is a research programme that has achieved 
some signifi cant insights, but also created some 
problems that need to be tackled. In the following 
I argue that most of the key insights and issues 
of this research programme, notably ethics and 
the cultivation of aﬀ ect, are highly productive but 
may need to be balanced by a more existential ap-
proach that foregrounds the many concerns and 
pursuits of everyday life. Some issues however, no-
tably the juxtaposition of the Islamic and the secu-
lar/liberal, are fl awed and may need to be revised 
in favour of an approach that is more perceptive of 
the situational, pragmatic and incomplete nature 
of discursive power.
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later the anthropologists of Islam already encoun-
tered an abstract notion of religion as a corpus, 
and to an increasing degree also as a system and 
as an agent (and this encounter has further con-
tributed to Muslims’ increasing objectifi cation of 
Islam during the past century, see Starrett 1998). 
Although most of them were not believers in Islam, 
and some of them even openly hostile to it, they 
nevertheless found it very easy to deal with it as 
something, an entity, a thing.
Why is it so convenient to deal with the adhe-
rence of people to Muhammad’s message as an 
entity? The fact that Muslims themselves com-
monly do so is not a suﬃ  cient answer, for the ty-
pical answers given by anthropologists diﬀ er a lot 
from the typical answers given by Muslims (that 
is, Muslims not trained in anthropology). For Mus-
lims, Islam is neither a blueprint, nor a multitude, 
nor a discursive tradition. For Muslims, Islam is 
the true Religion of God.3
To use an extremely old-fashioned anthropologi-
cal term, »Islam« is a very abstract and powerful 
fetish: an entity imagined and created by humans 
that, because people ascribe it power, begins to 
have power over them. As a fetish, Islam is in a 
way even more powerful than God, because God is 
always surrounded by secrets and mysteries, and 
His motivations and plans are beyond human un-
derstanding, while Islam can be studied, analysed, 
explained and interpreted. And every study, every 
explanation, every analysis and interpretation ma-
kes it more solid, more factual and more powerful 
over those who engage it – regardless of whether 
they believe in it or not.
From a social scientifi c point of view, the ques-
tion of what Islam »is« is a bad one, because the 
logic of the question already loads the category of 
Islam with expectations. Expectations that by kno-
wing what it »is« we will know what will happen 
to people who believe in it. No matter what our 
answer to the question of what Islam »is«, by pur-
suing the question we will willingly or unwillingly 
contribute to the power of our belief in the fetish 
of Islam, making it more solid and encompassing. 
For a Muslim proselytiser, this makes good sen-
se. But for us as social scientists concerned with 
the human condition and human agency, there is 
good reason to be cautious about a question that 
reinforces, instead of investigating, the growing 
imagination of a world religion as an entity with 
agency.
and objectifi ed Islam as textbook knowledge (see Eickelman 
1992 and Starrett 1998).
3 My free translation, oriented toward vernacular usage, 
of the Qur’an verse »Inna al-islâm huwa ad-dîn ‘ind Allâh« 
which is commonly quoted by Muslims to state the suprema-
cy of Islam over other faiths. This is in fact the only passage 
in the Qur’an that allows the interpretation of Islam as a 
religion rather than as an act of the individual believer.
of »religion« that posits Islam as belonging to the 
same class of things as Buddhism would be rather 
beside the point.
But if Asad is rightly sceptical of the heuristic va-
lue of the term »religion«, his students are very con-
fi dent about the heuristic value of another general 
notion: tradition. Asad’s name is nowadays regularly 
mentioned in articles and conference papers whose 
authors explain that they »understand Islam as a 
discursive tradition«. As mentioned before, it is not 
my intention in this context to discuss the premises 
and implications of the notion of discursive tradition. 
What I want to focus on now is that those who argue 
that Islam is a discursive tradition do not argue that 
Christianity, Marxism, human rights, anthropology 
etc., are also discursive traditions – although this 
certainly can be argued and has been taken into 
consideration in the context of the anthropology of 
Christianity (Anidjar 2009). They are not involved in 
the general study of discursive traditions, but in the 
study of Islam in particular, and they fi nd it impor-
tant for the purposes of their analysis and argumen-
tation to specify what Islam is. The label »Islam as 
a discursive tradition« as it is commonly used these 
days is thus less often about an actual inquiry into 
discursive traditions (but see Salvatore 2007), and 
more often about an attempt to fi nd a frame that al-
lows one to look at Islam as a whole.
What, then, does »Islam« explain that makes it 
so important to know what it is? Evidently it is im-
portant, otherwise it wouldn’t keep us so busy.
Islam is the name of the religion founded by Mu-
hammad on the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th cen-
tury A.D. In the literal meaning of the Arabic word, 
»Islam« means submission, that is, submission of 
the human to God. In its archaic meaning, Islam 
is an act, and therefore has no agency. Agency, if 
any, lies with the human believer who submits her 
or his will and acts under the supreme agency of 
God. And yet Muslims today speak of Islam less 
as an act of the believer and more as an entity ex-
ternal to the believer. What is important is that at 
some point, probably long before even the oldest 
Western anthropologists were born, a gradual 
conceptual shift began that turned Islam from an 
act and a disposition into a corpus of norms, pro-
cedures and attitudes, and eventually into system 
that itself prescribes acts and attitudes, a system 
that, metaphorically or literally, is granted agency 
that is God’s: commanding, prohibiting, knowing, 
describing, sanctioning.2 So the Orientalists and 
2 It is necessary to specify that historically speaking, there 
probably was no direct shift from »God« to »Islam« as the fo-
cus of attention. Importantly, Muslim intellectual traditions 
typically focussed on scholarly masters and related to their 
specifi c arguments and the traditions they established. The 
increasingly systemic quality of »Islam« emerged through 
these intellectual traditions, but it only became dominant 
in the 20th century, when mass education and media made 
traditions of scholarly transmission increasingly obsolete 
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the connections between everyday religiosity and 
religious scholarship and the relationship between 
Muslim practices of piety and secular architectu-
res of power. For the anthropology of Islam, these 
works have come to constitute what Imre Laka-
tos (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) has described 
as a research programme, that is, a shared set of 
problems, methods and terminology that provide 
productive fi elds of research. According to Laka-
tos, a research programme is seldom proven false, 
because its key premises and theories can always 
be protected through ad hoc theories. Instead, the 
key criterion by which the success of a research 
programme can be judged is its capability to pro-
duce new problems and solutions. This is a prag-
matic criterion and a useful one for inquiring what 
is and what is not accomplished by the research 
programme of ethics, piety and tradition.
While this research programme is most promi-
nently associated with the work of Saba Mahmood 
(2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2006), it is far from 
unifi ed, of course, and diﬀ erent lines of inquiry re-
garding ethics and piety have been developed in 
the works of Michael Lambek (2000), Heiko Hen-
kel (2005), Lara Deeb (2006) and Stefania Pandolfo 
(2007), to mention just few of the many worth men-
tioning. The insights provided in these works have 
been taken up in recent years by a veritable fl ood 
of publications marked with the keywords of pie-
ty, tradition and ethics. This emerging fi eld of stu-
dy, albeit far from unifi ed, is marked by a shared 
preoccupation with Muslims’ pious practice, alig-
ned with a framing of the enquiry as one about »Is-
lam as a discursive tradition«. While some authors 
have been making rather free and eclectic use of 
these themes (see, e.g. Starrett 1998, Ismail 2003, 
Schulz 2006), in other cases there is a tendency 
to develop a canon of references and concepts to 
the degree that, especially in northern America, 
one may speak of the emergence of something like 
an orthodox canon  (see, e.g. Scott and Hirschkind 
2006; Anjum 2007).4
The research programme of piety, ethics and 
tradition has made it possible to recognise much 
better how Muslims’ engagement with their religi-
on is neither the outcome of blind adherence, nor 
the result of coercion, but an active and dynamic 
process of engagement with ideals of good life and 
personhood – a point that has been truly impor-
tant in a decade overshadowed by the global »war 
of terror«, as it perhaps should more accurately 
4 This is a development that has to do with institutional 
politics as much as with the nature of the argument itself, 
and the infl uence of the research programme of piety and 
ethics is correspondingly uneven across the international 
academic fi eld. Its infl uence is most marked in northern 
America. In Europe it has been appropriated more critical-
ly. It seems to be rather marginal in the Francophone and 
Spanish-speaking worlds.
The focus on Islam as a peculiar entity of its own 
kind is part of a history of exceptionalism in the 
study of cultures and societies in which Islam is 
the dominant religious tradition. Even in variants 
that are radically critical of Orientalism, it carries 
an Orientalist heritage: an assumption that Is-
lam is something signifi cantly diﬀ erent from »the 
West«. Instead of being the backward other of Eu-
ropean modernity, Islam may now be taken up as 
the pious other of secularism, the resisting other 
of neo-colonialism or the methodological other of 
comparative social science. Elevated to such a po-
sition of signifi cant alterity, the religious traditions 
of Muslims gain particular brilliance and impor-
tance for the sake of highlighting their particula-
rity through their diﬀ erence. But at the same time, 
the faith and lives of Muslims in their own unique-
ness, their specifi city in their own right – and not 
just comparatively – become opaque, reduced to 
their Islamic-ness. To study Islam as »something« 
makes it much easier to enter sophisticated theo-
retical debates, but it also makes it much easier 
to overlook the ways Islam actually matters in the 
lives of people who adhere to it.
The problem, then, lies not with the answer but 
with the question. If we should give any anthropo-
logical answer at all to the question of what Islam 
is, we must fi rst realise that this is an empirical 
question. The answer depends on the situation at 
hand, the people involved, the dynamics evolving 
and the questions we as researchers are asking. 
This is not to say that the question or the answers 
to it should be bare of theoretical directions. That 
would be a sure recipe for bad research. But it is 
to say that our theoretical directions should have 
a diﬀ erent focus. If we want to understand what it 
means to live a Muslim life, then we need a groun-
ded and nuanced understanding of what it means 
to live a life – more urgently than we need a so-
phisticated theory about what Islam is.
But the problem is not settled yet. The two ques-
tions of what Islam is and what it means to live a 
life are commonly intertwined. And they are inti-
mately bound together in what may be the most 
infl uential and productive research programme in 
the anthropology of Islam at the moment: the stu-
dy of piety, ethics and tradition.
Piety, ethics, tradition
The tremendous signifi cance of Talal Asad’s work 
for the contemporary anthropology of Islam lies 
less in that particular short essay in which he deve-
lops the notion of discursive tradition (Asad 1986) 
than in the way his wider body of work (Asad 1993; 
2003; 2006; 2009) has been taken up and develo-
ped by a generation of anthropologists who have 
made creative use of his critical enquiries about 
religion and the secular in order to study the dyna-
mics of doctrinal debate among Muslim activists, 
the power of Islamic ideals of morality and piety, 
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recognise the humanity of Muslims (and anyone 
else) as they see themselves and not reduce them 
to the ideological patterns of Western liberalism.
As a political critique, this master narrative is 
justifi ed. Certainly European and American po-
liticians, intellectuals, journalists and ordinary 
citizens very often do make questionable claims 
to civilisational and moral superiority, and such 
claims do need to be questioned. And certainly it 
is imperative to recognise the humanity of all peo-
ple, regardless of the notions and ideals they hold. 
As a paradigm of anthropological research, howe-
ver, this master narrative carries the risk that we 
will fi nd it too easy to point our fi nger at the usual 
suspects, with the result that our enquiries may 
fail to account for what is really at stake for the 
people involved. In the end we may once again fail 
to seriously recognise the humanity of people on 
their own terms.
To make this clearer, I oﬀ er a short critical re-
view of two recent contributions (both published 
in 2009) from this fi eld of study, not because I fi nd 
them bad, but on the contrary because I fi nd them 
so good that they deserve a serious critical enga-
gement that I hope may show where their power 
and where their problems lie.
The fi rst example is Saba Mahmood’s brilliant 
but also somehow hermetic essay »Religious Re-
ason and Secular Aﬀ ect: An Incommensurable 
Divide?« (Mahmood 2009), in which she scrutini-
zes the ways what she describes as secular and 
liberal assumptions about speech, law and mo-
ral injury have caused a misunderstanding about 
the reasons why Muslims so energetically protest 
against the cartoons published by the Danish 
daily Jyllandsposten in 2005. Mahmood argues 
that what really made Muslims upset about the 
cartoons was the way Muslim devotional tradi-
tion works towards building an intimate perso-
nal relationship with the Prophet Muhammad as 
an extension of the believer’s self and family, in 
contradistinction to a secular understanding of 
speech and meaning that insists on a clear dif-
ferentiation of things and their representation.6 
For this reason, Mahmood argues, Europeans 
were unable and/or unwilling to understand the 
motivations of Muslims. Muslims in turn failed to 
successfully make their point and instead tried to 
6 This seems to be a rather reduced understanding of the 
complex ways of dealing with speech, image and representa-
tion in contemporary European cultures. Take, for example, 
the ways the swastika has become identifi ed with Nazi ter-
ror. One may successfully claim with European media that 
a caricature depicting the Prophet Muhammad in an unfa-
vourable way is »just a caricature«, yet one might expect a 
lot less understanding if one claimed that a Nazi fl ag is »just 
a fl ag«. So Europeans do seem to be very well able to think 
beyond the fl at distinction of things and representation. But 
some of them may not want to do so if it would suggest ma-
king important political and ideological concessions.
be called. But this research programme has also 
magnifi ed some of the problems inherent in the an-
thropological turn to Islam as the key to the lives 
of Muslims. These are problems that many in the 
fi eld are acutely aware of, and many share the sen-
se that it is necessary to look beyond the elegant 
but narrow confi nes of piety and tradition and to 
include the messier but richer fi elds of everyday 
experiences,5 personal biographies and complex 
genealogies (see, e.g. Abu-Lughod 1996 [1986]; Ew-
ing 1990; Marsden 2005; Osella and Soares 2009; 
Masquelier 2009; Moors 2009; Bangstad 2009b; 
Deeb 2009). Part of the problem is located in the 
specifi c focus on moral and pious subjectivity. Ano-
ther part is based in the wider master narrative in 
which the study of Islam as ethics and tradition is 
commonly embedded.
The fi rst part of the problem – moral and pious 
subjectivity – is primarily one of balance, whereby 
the privileging of pious pursuits in isolation from 
wider paths of life has contributed to accounts of 
religious experience that are based more on what 
people argue for and less on how they actually live. 
All I want to add to this problem are some practi-
cal suggestions on how a more balanced approach 
could be accomplished while building on the im-
portant insights about ethics and subjectivity. I 
will return to this point towards the end of this 
paper. The second part of the problem – the wider 
master narrative – is a more fundamental one and 
may require some more substantial rethinking, 
which is why I try to tackle it in some more detail 
in the following.
Islam vs. liberalism
The key themes of this research programme in the 
anthropology of Islam – ethics, piety, subjectivity, 
self-formation, the cultivation of aﬀ ect, debate, 
governmental rationality – are very often bound 
together by a master narrative that posits the Mus-
lim tradition of ethics, aﬀ ect, devotion and debate 
in juxtaposition with liberal and secular notions 
about the state, law, self and so on. This juxtapo-
sition is not merely an analytical tool; it is part 
and parcel of a political self-critique of liberalism 
and secularism aimed at revealing how the alleged 
superiority and universality of Western traditions 
of enlightenment actually conceal mechanisms of 
coercion, silencing, and exclusion, as well as cultu-
rally and historically specifi c notions that cannot 
be taken to be valid for all of humanity. The coun-
ter-claim made by this critique is that we have to 
5 By juxtaposing »elegant but narrow« with »messy but 
rich«, I am obviously making an aesthetic distinction and 
equating it with a distinction in the substance of the argu-
ment. This is intended. As is known among anthropologists 
at least since the Writing Culture debate, the ways one wri-
tes anthropology cannot be separated from the substance of 
the argument one makes.
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prophet, a caricature could cause a strong sense of 
moral injury in a way other provocations could not. 
And yet Mahmood’s analysis strikes me as proble-
matic, because I miss something of the emotional 
dynamics I encountered during the controversy. It 
oﬀ ers only a partial account of why the caricature 
controversy could arouse such strong emotions. 
Because Mahmood’s analysis is so much focussed 
on the quasi-systemic features of an Islamic and a 
liberal model of cultivating political and religious 
aﬀ ect, her analysis remains confi ned to this duali-
ty. But this duality is not helpful if we want to un-
derstand the emotional dynamics of the caricature 
controversy.
I was in Egypt at the time of the controversy, 
and my impression was that something more was 
going on. I encountered people being at once an-
gry and enthusiastic about defending their pro-
phet. Pain and anger were actively cultivated and 
exercised as part of an intensive and enthusias-
tic event through which people felt encouraged to 
express a strong emotional sense of aﬀ ection and 
oﬀ ence. At least in Egypt, the controversy was not 
just a reaction of Muslims »committed to preser-
ving an imaginary in which their relation to the 
Prophet is based on similitude and cohabitation« 
(88). It was part of a dynamic process of creating 
and promoting – rather than just preserving – a 
specifi c religious and political sensitivity. And it 
provided many people a very gratifying possibility 
to do something good, something real in defence of 
the Prophet: boycott Denmark.
As I returned to the Netherlands, I found a 
strikingly similar sentiment being cultivated in 
the press and in informal discussions among my 
friends. Rather than a secular rationality at work, 
what I saw was a much more plain and old-fashioned 
chauvinist gut reaction that turned the freedom 
to provoke Muslims into a matter of honour (and 
refusing to do so into a matter of cowardice), an 
issue at which one’s moral commitment to »our« 
shared values was measured. Again, I found peo-
ple rather enthusiastic about having a clear sense 
of fear and oﬀ ence, about feeling justifi ed anger 
and being able to make a strong point about where 
they stand.
On both sides, the issue was roiled again and 
again for many weeks, oﬀ ering the people involved 
a strong sense of righteous indignation, emotional 
bonding and knowing one’s place. Thus while the 
discourses and the arguments expressed as well as 
the specifi c moments of moral injury experienced 
on both sides of the controversy may have been 
diﬀ erent, the emotional quality of the event was 
often strikingly similar on both sides; and this can 
be explained by neither Islamic tradition nor secu-
lar power. If we want to understand why the reac-
tion of Muslims – and indeed, just like them, the 
defenders of the cartoons who reacted in emotio-
nally similar ways – was not irrational, it is there-
make reference to European laws against discri-
mination and hate speech without understanding 
that the European practice of law regarding mo-
ral oﬀ ence is by nature majoritarian and unlikely 
to take seriously the concerns of a religious mi-
nority, the more so as their concerns are not cor-
rectly translated due to a misconception about 
the nature of speech and representation, a mis-
conception that, according to Mahmood, is essen-
tially due to a »normative understanding of religi-
on internal to liberalism« (Mahmood 2009: 74).
Mahmood’s primary level of analysis is highly 
sophisticated cultural concepts, such as  Ferd-
ninand de Saussure’s theory of language (Mah-
mood 2009: 72). While she does quote the voices 
of Muslims to develop the point about the emo-
tional importance of intimate attachment to the 
Prophet, in general the article moves on a high 
level of abstraction where concepts, rationalities 
and traditions – rather than people – are the main 
agents. This becomes especially clear in the way 
the secular, the liberal and the state repeatedly 
appear not just as key analytical categories but as 
things, so much that they are implicitly attributed 
agency:
(...) contrary to the ideological self-under-
standing of secularism (as the doctrinal sepa-
ration of religion and state), secularism has 
historically entailed the regulation and re-
formation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and 
practices to yield a particular normative con-
ception of religion (that is largely Protestant 
Christian in its contours). (Mahmood 2009: 87)
Historically speaking, the secular state has not 
simply cordoned oﬀ  religion from its regulatory 
ambitions but sought to remake it through the 
agency of the law. (Ibid.)
There thus emerges an over-arching and all-pre-
sent secular rationality, embodied by the national 
state and intimately paired with liberalism in a way 
that is not explained. Mahmood takes up the car-
toon controversy as a point to drive home the point 
that »the secular« is inherently partial, saturated 
with power and prejudice, and hence unlikely to 
fulfi l its publicly proclaimed promise of inclusion 
and tolerance. In other words, her critique targets 
these abstract entities and not the Europeans who 
found it convenient not to take seriously Muslims’ 
concerns.
Mahmood does oﬀ er a welcome clarifi cation 
about the importance of emotional attachment 
that makes the person of the prophet Muhammad 
such a sensitive issue for Muslims. Because of the 
work of an intimate and sensitive emotional bond 
that characterises Muslims’ veneration of their 
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I have no problem with the critique. I have a pro-
blem with the juxtaposition. In my view, this kind 
of an anthropological theory does a bad job insofar 
as it does not tell us how it actually is to live under 
the conditions it describes. In the abstract image 
of secular/liberal rationality I recognize neither 
the Europe in which I grew up, nor the Europe in 
which I live (there is quite a diﬀ erence between 
the two, marked by the end of the Cold War). For 
one thing, secularism is in no way particularly li-
beral, and at least where I come from (Finland) 
secularism has been at least as much if not more 
related to socialism, communism, occultism and 
the many other social and cultural movements that 
have marked the last century and half (see, e.g. Jo-
kinen 1906; Ervast 1928 [1903]; Soikkanen 1961). 
Furthermore, while Europe’s anti-Muslim new 
nationalist movements do write secularism large 
in their declarations, I see a more opportunistic 
populist usage, rather than an underlying secular 
rationality at work.
I also do not see the lives of Muslims in Egypt 
accounted for by this theory. The traditions of 
Muslim devotion are important but not suﬃ  cient 
to account for the complex lives my Muslim friends 
and interlocutors live – not to mention the degree 
to which the forms and aims of Muslim devotion 
have shifted in a matter of just a generation or 
two from an emphasis on saintly intercession and 
communal belonging towards an emphasis on mo-
ral knowledge and activist commitment (see also 
Deeb 2006).
One could object that I am taking issue here 
with Mahmood’s specifi c preference for high the-
oretical critique rather than with the substance 
of her argument. With my declared preference for 
grounded and dialogical ethnography, my objec-
tions would therefore be more a matter of taste 
than a serious argument. There may be something 
to this objection, which is why I want to take up 
another example that is more ethnographic and 
more sensitive to the actual lives of people but in 
which the ethnography is framed by the contrast 
of the Islamic and the secular.
This second example is Nadia Fadil’s article 
»Managing aﬀ ects and sensibilities: The case of 
not-handshaking and not-fasting«. (Fadil 2009). 
Fadil, too, explores the issue of causing and taking 
oﬀ ence, but her focus is less on abstract notions 
and more on the pragmatics of everyday life. In 
a rich and sensitive fashion she looks at the ex-
periences and narratives of two groups of Muslim 
women in Belgium: pious women who insist on 
not shaking hands with men, and impious women 
who insist on not fasting during Ramadan. Both 
are highly aware that their insistence will oﬀ end 
the sensibilities of some of the people with whom 
they interact and try to balance the complicated 
demands of standing by their principles and of 
showing tact towards their colleagues, friends and 
fore not suﬃ  cient to provide a nuanced theoretical 
analysis of the way a revered person becomes part 
of a believer’s self. This does make it easier to un-
derstand the kind of injury involved, but it does not 
yet allow us to understand how and why that injury 
was cultivated with such enthusiasm (and how and 
why a diﬀ erent sense of injury was cultivated with 
similar enthusiasm on the other side). In my view, 
the Danish caricature aﬀ air was an event of me-
aningful anger on both sides: an occasion to feel 
and express righteous anger about being hurt and 
threatened in a way that both requires and allows 
a clear response. As such, I suggest that if we look 
for an interpretive framework to understand it, po-
pulism may do much better than a juxtaposition of 
secular/religious reason and aﬀ ect.
Populism, Leena Avonius (2008) argues in her 
study on Sharia implementation in Aceh, is a mo-
dality of political discourse and mobilisation that 
turns a diﬀ use and often implicit moral »gut fee-
ling« into simple slogans and personifi ed distinc-
tions of good and evil, us and them. Populism is 
furthermore characterised by a highly opportu-
nistic use of whatever legitimate discourses are 
available (such as Sharia in Aceh or secularism in 
the Netherlands) in order to place them in the ser-
vice of an personifi ed political battle. By making it 
possible to give names to a sense of moral unease, 
populism not only allows one to express implicit 
moral anxieties, it is also oﬀ ers a way to actively 
enlarge and aggravate them to a point of escala-
tion. The Danish cartoon aﬀ air is a prime lesson 
in how that works, although history of course does 
oﬀ er other lessons in populism that are much gra-
ver and much more terrible in their consequences. 
Since a key power of populism lies in its utility in 
naming and reinforcing anxieties that people really 
have, it would be mistaken to label populism simply 
as false. Yet thinking about global events of anger 
in terms of populist agitation may help us look bey-
ond explicit discursive justifi cation and give more 
attention to the emotions that are being cultivated.
While Mahmood’s point about the specifi c kind 
of emotional bond Muslims cultivate with their 
Prophet and about the specifi c kind of expectations 
and anxieties that are involved in applying positi-
ve law do take us a step further, her insistence on 
framing this as a quasi-systemic diﬀ erence bet-
ween the Islamic and the secular/liberal results in 
a brilliant theoretical critique that somehow mis-
ses the point. It misses the point, I argue, because 
the engagement with Islamic tradition and secu-
larism/liberalism is informed by a political meta-
narrative that directs the analysis towards a ge-
neric critique of modern power and away from the 
actual lives, emotions and experiences of people in 
their everyday lives. In the end, what we see is a 
critique of idealised secular and liberal self-under-
standings by means of their juxtaposition with an 
equally idealised Islamic tradition.
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Fadil treats the problem of giving moral oﬀ ence 
indicates that the solution does not work well and 
that a better solution is needed.
What we need, then, are better narratives of 
exactly how powerful discourses work in practice 
and of what powerful discourses there are out the-
re anyway. I must admit that I do not have a clear 
solution to this problem, but I will try to make 
some suggestions.
The problem with the meta-narrative of a cri-
tique of secular and liberal power through its 
other, Islam, is that it reduces the complexity, rich-
ness and ambivalence (which is not necessarily 
painful, but often also joyful, see Marsden 2005) of 
human experience into providing evidence against 
a liberal/secular power constellation. Especially in 
Mahmood’s essay and to a less sharp degree also 
in Fadil’s article, the reader is presented with an 
image of a secular/liberal hegemony so strongly 
reduced to few key terms, notions and powerful 
points of view that to me it looks very much like 
a straw man and very much unlike the European 
cultures and societies as I know them. Perhaps a 
critical anthropology of secularism and new nati-
onalism would do much better if it gave up or at 
least toned down its paradigmatic equation of the 
secular with the liberal and the nation state, and 
instead included the life worlds, experiences and 
trajectories of being secular in their main focus. 
This would certainly involve expanding the list of 
powerful discourses to include much more than 
the liberal. It would also involve the pragmatics 
of acting on the side of power, something that I 
see very sensitively accomplished by Oskar Ver-
kaaik (2010) in his study of the ways Dutch civil 
servants run naturalisation ceremonies that have 
been established as part of a cultural nationalist 
policy – a policy that the civil servants are often 
critical of, and yet they often end up endorsing 
it in subtle ways. Such ethnographic and histo-
riographic enquiry would be likely to be more 
successful in tracing the connections of existen-
tial concerns, powerful discourses and the prag-
matics of action in a way that is critical without 
being reductionist.
Compelling pursuits
Regardless of the points of critique that I have 
made and the many more points others have made 
(Marsden 2005; Van Der Veer 2008; Bangstad 
2009a; Simon 2009; Starrett 2010) about the turn 
to the cultivation of ethics and the master narrati-
ve of Islamic tradition vs. secular power, I do fi nd 
it important to highlight that this turn, whatever 
its problems may be, has provided some important 
insights into the study of the human condition. And 
that, of course, is what counts.
The turn to look at a creed as a discursive tra-
dition oﬀ ered an important step forward by focus-
sing our attention to the fact that religion is not 
families. Their situations and positions are quite 
diﬀ erent, however, Fadil argues, because the way 
»we« view their actions from a liberal perspective 
with its maxims of authenticity and outspokenness 
privileges the not-fasting women against the not-
handshaking women.
As for Mahmood, also for Fadil the diﬀ erence is 
once again one of Islamic tradition on one side and 
liberal and secular notions of personhood on the 
other. Fadil is careful to point out that this is not 
a hermetic boundary: the not-handshaking Muslim 
women’s understandings of selfhood and agency 
are in a signifi cant way infl uenced by liberal no-
tions they have appropriated, and the not-fasting 
women’s sensibilities and also some of their solu-
tions are informed by their intimate rootedness 
in Muslim families and embodied traditions. This 
diﬀ erentiated outlook notwithstanding, Fadil’s 
analytical framework stands and falls with the ca-
tegorical diﬀ erence between the Islamic and the 
secular/liberal, and this categorical diﬀ erence is 
once again more than an analytical framework: in 
the fi nal instance, it is a political critique of the 
way a »liberal« common sense views some choices 
as legitimate and others as illegitimate.
This is a valid point, and a necessary one in or-
der to make the reader realise that both the not-
handshaking and the not-fasting women are ma-
king complex moral and pragmatic choices that 
must be taken seriously. And yet by insisting on 
this as the key point, her analysis falls short of her 
ethnography. Some of Fadil’s ethnographic mate-
rial makes it very clear that there are multiple – 
partly competing, partly combined – claims to and 
determinations of a normality, all of which come 
together in people’s lives in complex and often si-
tuational ways. Some of them make a diﬀ erence 
among colleagues while others make a diﬀ erence 
among family. But some of the very though-provo-
king material is used to come to rather sweeping 
and (meanwhile) conventional conclusions about 
the power of the secular/liberal to determine a 
specifi c normality. Fadil’s critique of secular po-
wer stops short of accounting for what it means to 
be aware that one’s convictions and actions can be 
oﬀ ensive to others, what kind of oﬀ ences may be 
involved, what may be at stake for the people invol-
ved and why diﬀ erent situations create diﬀ erent 
kinds of oﬀ ence. To accomplish this, it might have 
been helpful to look at the not-handshaking and 
not-fasting women more in their own right and less 
as representatives of an Islamic-secular divide.
Fadil, however, aims at more. The problem Fadil 
tries to tackle is how to account for the pragmatics 
of moral action without losing sight of the reali-
ty of powerful discursive registers that pave the 
way for certain paths while closing others. This is 
a problem to which the master narrative of the cri-
tique of the secular oﬀ ers a very compelling soluti-
on. In my view, however, the ambiguity with which 
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ety movement that promotes a rigorous moral and 
religious discipline.
In Alexandria, Egypt’s second-largest city 
whither the upper and middle class Cairine head 
for summer vacation, the cosmopolitan heritage 
and easygoing holiday atmosphere of this port 
city has been challenged by the spectacular rise 
of various Islamic movements, most importantly 
the Salafi  movement, which controls a large part 
of the mosques, especially in the eastern districts 
of the city. Men sporting long beards and short-
hemmed trousers and women wearing a full veil 
(niqâb) covering their entire bodies have become 
more and more common in the streets of the city. 
But also those who do not join the Salafi  movement 
generally show a strong sense of emotional com-
mitment to the religion of Islam. There is a very 
wide consensus about the need for Muslims to fear 
God, to fulfi l their religious duties, to shape their 
lives and societies accordingly and to defend their 
faith, their Prophet and their Muslim brothers and 
sisters.
In Cairo, Egypt’s gigantic capital, a similar 
image prevails. Buildings, public transportation, 
shops and homes are covered with posters, sti-
ckers and graﬃ  ti calling people to pray and fast, 
to mind their manners and to cultivate their cha-
racters, to fi ght the Jews and to feed the poor, for 
women to cover themselves and for men to teach 
Islam to their families. Religious literature domi-
nates the newsstands and bookstores. Broadcasts 
and cassette recordings of the Qur’ân and sermons 
are routinely played in cafés, busses, shops and 
homes. While various social niches especially in 
Cairo and Alexandria continue to encourage world 
views and lifestyles that are at odds with the wave 
of Islamisation, most of the upper- and middle-
class citizens have come to embrace the wave of 
the Islamic revival, albeit in ways that do not chal-
lenge the sources of their wealth or their pursuit of 
consumerist pleasure (Lutfi  2009 [2005]).
This image is far from harmonious. While the-
re has been a signifi cant increase in religiosity as 
well as a general turn to a specifi c kind of religi-
osity, this does not mean that Egypt has become 
a generally more pious, moral or happy country. 
There are many ambiguities and contradictions, 
and some of them are sharp. In the village, young 
people express a nihilistic sense of boredom and 
frustration in spite of the great promises of moder-
nist progress and religious hope they have embra-
ced. The village has become a local centre of drug 
trade in recent years as marihuana and hashish 
have swept the black market in tremendous quan-
tities and at low prices, and an increasing number 
of young people have become habitual consumers. 
In Alexandria, the rising commitment to religion 
has also become a breeding ground for violent con-
fessional clashes between Muslims and Christians 
that have cost many lives (mostly of Christians) 
about gods, books and institutions, but about the 
ways people worship gods, read books and act in 
institutions. This may appear to be a trivial insight, 
and yet it seems to be necessary to keep remin-
ding colleagues, students, intellectuals, publicists 
and politicians about it. Also, the turn to the cul-
tivation of aﬀ ect has been an important step for-
ward in the way of understanding what it means 
to believe in something and to live a life guided by 
that belief. And the critical theoretisation of the 
secular has oﬀ ered ways to think about modern 
power and subjectivity in ways that go beyond the 
self-celebratory tendency of modernist secula-
rism. The question for me, then, is: how can we go 
on from here? How can we overcome the problems 
of this line of research without losing sight of the 
insights it has to oﬀ er? How can we account for the 
ways people express perfectionist ideals in pursuit 
of living a complex, imperfect life? How can we tell 
about the motivations and pressures that make 
some ideas so compelling? How can we tell about 
the ways a meaningful world is imagined and the 
ways it both shapes and is shaped by people’s ex-
pectations and lives?
This is an ethnographic problem as much as it is 
a theoretical one, and for the sake of an answer I 
will start by taking a look at the situation in three 
sites in Egypt where I have been conducting fi eld-
work since 2002.
In present-day Egypt, Islam has become omni-
present. Like many other places around the world, 
Egypt has been swept by a veritable religious eu-
phoria since the 1970’s. Religion is continuously 
visible, audible and palpable. And it has become 
characterised to an unprecedented degree by an 
enormous emphasis on individual learning, know-
ledge and practice, guided by the perfectionist aim 
to create a pious character that is »committed« 
(multazim, a term borrowed from the nationalist/
modernist notion of engagement (Klemm 2000)) to 
religion as a complete framework of emotions, will 
and acts.
In a village that I call Nazlat al-Rayyis in nort-
hern Egypt, a strong sense prevails that people 
have become more religious and that this is a very 
good thing. People greet each other with the Isla-
mic greeting »peace be upon you« (as-salamu ‘alay-
kum) rather than with the confessionally neutral 
»good morning/evening«; a lofty new mosque is 
being built in the outskirts of the village (although 
the work has temporarily stopped as a result of 
the global fi nancial crisis); the bar in the villa-
ge closed decades ago; and all adult women now 
wear the headscarf (higâb) as a part of a covering 
dress that reveals only hands, feet and face. In a 
village that was once a socialist and communist 
stronghold, the Muslim Brotherhood has become 
the most important political force and the most 
important religious one, along with the Salafi  pi-
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kinds of stickers, neatly organised next to each 
other:
»Don’t forget to invoke God«
Photo of Nancy Ajram (Lebanese female pop 
singer)
»This is due to the grace of my Lord« (a pious 
phrase against envy)
Photo of Haifa Wehbe (Egyptian-Lebanese female 
pop singer)
»I seek refuge in the Lord of the dawn... « (a 
chapter of the Qur’ân believed to protect from 
evil and envy).
Zapping through satellite television the way 
many Egyptians do, one can quickly shift between 
a Salafi  sermon, a video clip, a news programme, an 
Egyptian soap opera, a Hollywood fi lm, a football 
match, a talk show and so on. Yet one thing that 
unites almost all programmes (with the exception 
of some state channels) is their commercial nature 
and the aggressive advertisements they make for 
commercial text message services that have be-
come a fi nancial backbone of television channels 
of various kinds.
Whenever one goes for a walk on the seafront 
of Alexandria and on the Nile promenades of Cai-
ro, the scenery is without exception dominated 
by lovers (habbîba in Egyptian Arabic). Pairs of 
young people walk or sit on the promenades, tal-
king to each other, sometimes holding hands, al-
ways closely together, always keeping as much 
polite distance as possible from other pairs. In 
another minibus, this one driving up and down 
the seafront in Alexandria, religious stickers ad-
monish youths about dating: »Didn’t he know that 
God sees?« »Would you accept it for your sister?« 
»Where is your life?« Indeed, the idea of young un-
married people dating, sitting shoulder to shoul-
der, holding hands and possibly kissing is a cause 
of considerable moral and religious unease among 
Egyptians. But at the same time, the same Egypti-
ans also consider the meetings of lovers as a natu-
ral part of life, write and consume love poetry and 
songs, enthusiastically celebrate Valentine’s day 
and proudly identify themselves as the romantic 
people (Kreil forthcoming). Some of them do deci-
de to become »committed« and to give up all the 
ambivalence, stop writing love letters and looking 
the opposite sex into the eyes and instead dedi-
cate themselves to the purpose of purifi ed piety. 
But for many of them this remains a passing peri-
od in their lives, one part of a complex and often 
troubled biography. And sometimes even the most 
energetic Salafi s fall madly in love.
Diﬀ erent worlds stand here side by side: the 
world of Islam as a regime of divine protection, 
order and justice; the world of commercial media 
with its reliance on consumerism, advertisement 
and sexual attraction; the world of romantic love 
in recent years. While public moral discourse fo-
cusses very strongly on the rigorous prohibition of 
adultery, both Alexandria and Cairo have become 
centres of prostitution for wealthy Egyptians and 
Arab tourists, often arranged for in the form of 
very short-term Islamic ‘urfî marriages.
Yet most of the ambiguities surrounding the Is-
lamic revival are actually of a much less dramatic 
and bleak nature than those listed above. Rather 
than dark cracks in a perfectionist image of hope, 
they present themselves as a complex patchwork 
of diﬀ erent kinds of hope, diﬀ erent senses of living 
a good life. The same people who repent their sins 
and think about the Afterlife also debate the pre-
vious evening’s football match, tell jokes, feel tired 
and glance at the opposite sex, even with religious 
stickers decorating the walls and the voice of the 
Qur’ân in the background. They entertain ideals of 
obsessive romantic love that defi es all norms. They 
search for a place in life, try to be responsible to-
wards their families and dream about new possibi-
lities for themselves. They try to make money and 
to move up in society, often by any means possib-
le. And at diﬀ erent moments, they hold diﬀ erent 
points of view and outlooks on life, arguing for 
them in very diﬀ erent tones. What happens, then, 
to the power of guidance, the purity that was the 
very reason and the justifi cation for the ubiquitous 
everyday presence of religious objects and signs?
Writing on cassette tape sermons, Charles 
Hirschkind (2006) has fi ttingly described their 
presence as an »ethical soundscape« that fi lls and 
structures the noisy and crowded spaces of Cairo. 
The sensory presence of Islam as an overwhelming 
and compelling idiom of life, morality and politics 
is in fact almost omnipresent. It is present in the 
sounds of prayer calls, sermons and recitations, in 
the visual presence of religious decoration, graﬃ  ti, 
stickers and the minarets that mark the skyline. It 
is present in the bodily motions of prayer and invo-
cation, the strain of wearing covering dress in hot 
weather, the weariness caused by fasting, the ex-
change of greetings, phrases and handshakes and 
the smell of certain perfumes preferred by Sala-
fi  activists. But this sensory presence is seldom 
clearly diﬀ erentiated from other, very diﬀ erent 
kinds of sounds, images and surfaces that mark 
the everyday life of the big city and the provinces 
alike. Rather than a competition between pious 
and secular sensory regimes, an unpredictable co-
existence of diﬀ erent nuances, moments and regis-
ters characterises daily life in Egypt.
A kiosk at a bus station in Cairo, decorated with 
verses of the Qur’an and stickers with moral and 
pious messages, has the radio turned on, playing 
the newest mellow love song produced by a Saudi-
owned and Lebanon-based music corporation. A 
minibus arriving on the bus station from the coun-
tryside has been decorated by its owner with two 
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paralleled by other approaches to subjectivity that 
are more concerned with ambivalence (Luhrmann 
2006; Biehl et al. 2007). Both were preceded by an 
engagement with the issue of multiple identities, 
an engagement that, whatever its shortcomings 
may be, provided important insights that appear 
to have been partly forgotten by the research pro-
gramme of piety and ethics (Ewing 1990; Wilce 
1998; Van Meijl 2006). The existence and impor-
tance of multiple voices, too, has been recognised 
for quite some time (see, e.g. Abu-Lughod 1996 
[1986]). And since the complexity of human cha-
racters is common knowledge and therefore also 
known by anthropologists, there is good reason 
to assume that this history could be taken much 
further back in time. Good ideas are usually quite 
old. There is thus no need to reinvent the wheel 
to account better for what it means to live a life of 
which Islam is a part. The theoretical directions 
are largely available.
In this light, what a good anthropology of being 
a Muslim needs most is a commitment to a sensiti-
ve and dialogical fi eldwork and an eye for the bio-
graphical and historical depth of people’s trajecto-
ries and societies, along with a theoretical analysis 
that is committed to doing justice to the people it 
tells about, which is far from a trivial task. In the 
end, this is more than a theoretical problem: it is a 
matter of an emotional commitment to anthropolo-
gy as a dialogue and an encounter.
Grounds of commitment
Above I have critically noted that there may be too 
much research on committed activists and too 
little research on the majority of Muslims who are 
not that committed. The empirical focus on the 
committed activists, I argued, seems to be rela-
ted to the theoretical focus on Islam as a key to 
understanding Muslim lives. While I am critical 
of this theoretical focus, this does not mean that 
I would argue that we should stop doing research 
on committed activists. But I do argue that thin-
king about the existential primacy of people’s 
search for a place in life and the tragic quality 
this search often takes also oﬀ ers us a diﬀ erent 
image of activist religious commitment. The pro-
blem with many of the numerous ethnographies 
about Muslims that have been published in recent 
years is that they take committed activism as 
the paradigmatic, normal standard of religiosity 
instead of looking at committed activists as what 
they are: committed activists who are willing to 
go very far beyond ordinary expectations for the 
sake of an important cause in a way most people 
are not. This is a characteristic feature of acti-
vism and should have a prominent place in the 
study with and of activists.
In my own ethnographic encounters with people 
who for a period of time have tried to live a dedi-
cated and activist religious life, two related moti-
with its celebration of passion. But these are not 
diﬀ erent worlds. They are constituent parts of 
people’s life worlds – life worlds that can never be 
explained by any single principle but that need to 
be understood in their complexity and openness, 
in their many hopes and frustrations (Jackson 
1996; 2005). While the conservative ethics of the 
religious revival may appear completely opposed 
to, for example, the liberal celebration of romance 
and sexuality in pop music, fi lm, video clips and 
youth culture, in fact one cannot be understood 
without the other, nor are they clearly distinct in 
people’s lives (Schielke 2009). An attempt to un-
derstand what exactly is going on must take these 
diﬀ erent highly compelling pursuits as parts of an 
essentially complex and often contradictory sub-
jective experience and practice.
I argue that we need to take these ambiguities 
seriously and to consider the ways people live them 
and their attempts to make sense of their lives. To 
understand what is going on, it is helpful indeed to 
look at the ways people cultivate emotional aﬀ ects, 
the ways sensual experience structures daily life 
and the ways people try to solve, circumvent or 
cope with complex moral dilemmas. It is not help-
ful, however, to work with idealised oppositions, 
such as revivalist piety vs. liberal secularism, be-
cause most people adhere to something of both 
(and something of many other things as well), to 
diﬀ erent degrees at diﬀ erent times. Nor is it help-
ful to hold the aspirational aspect of pursuing pi-
ety too high without taking into consideration the 
troubles and disappointments that are often an in-
evitable part of aspirational projects.
I suggest that one good way to provide a better 
account is to take seriously Michael Jackson’s ar-
gument about the primacy of existential concerns 
(Jackson 2005; see also Graw forthcoming). This 
means we should take as our starting point the 
immediate practice of living a life, the existential 
concerns and the pragmatic considerations that 
inform this practice, embedded in but not reduced 
to the traditions, powers and discourses that grant 
legitimacy to some concerns over others and struc-
ture some considerations while leaving others dif-
fuse. Following this existential line of enquiry, it 
is also important to realise that the ways people 
try to fi nd a place in life are ambiguous and often 
tragic in their outcomes. As Robert Orsi (2005) has 
shown in his work on American Catholicism, the 
same aspects that provide hope, recognition and 
inclusion can also be a source of frustration, inti-
midation and exclusion. This ambiguity appears to 
be characteristic of our attempts to live good lives, 
and an anthropology committed to understanding 
the human condition is well advised to take it se-
riously.
This is, in fact, something that has been taken 
seriously by anthropology for a long time. The cur-
rent preoccupation with ethics and subjectivity is 
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take seriously his idiosyncratic experience, his fa-
mily history and the characteristic way he some-
times marches and sometimes stumbles through 
life. And considering this idiosyncratic level also 
helps to make intelligible the more general fea-
tures of his quest.
Take, for the sake of comparison, the way Mus-
tafa describes his motivations to become a Salafi  
and the way John Steinbeck (1961 [1936]) has the 
literary fi gure of Jim Nolan describe his decision 
to join the Communist Party in his novel In Dubi-
ous Battle.
Nilson touched the desk here and there with his 
fi ngertips. »Even the people you’re trying to help 
will hate you most of the time. Do you know that?«
»Yes.« 
»Well, why do you want to join, then?«
Jim’s eyes half closed in perplexity. At last he 
said, »In the jail there were some Party men. 
They talked to me. Everything’s been a mess, all 
my life. Their lives weren’t messes. They were 
working toward something. I want to work to-
ward something. I feel dead. I thought I might 
get alive again.« (Steinbeck 1961 [1936]: 6)
In the time when I started to get back to mys-
elf I had lost many things. I started to search. 
Where is the right way? [...] I didn’t have a ba-
sic method that I could follow to solve my prob-
lems and to face the world. I had no principle to 
follow. I had no law that I could apply and that 
would allow me to tell right from wrong. [...]
I took to asking about everything in my life: Is it 
halâl or harâm? Even if I didn’t have awareness 
about it, no clear textual proof. But my feeling 
was: If only I could know whether this is haram 
or halâl? [...] For a while I lived a better life like I 
hadn’t lived it since the death of my father. It was 
even better. I got to know a lot of people, and I felt 
that the life I live is good. (Mustafa, interview in 
2006)
Would Mustafa have been attracted to communism 
instead of Salafi sm if he had lived in a diﬀ erent 
time? Interestingly enough, his father was. But for 
Mustafa, the answer is probably no. Communism 
and Salafi sm are diﬀ erent solutions, not because 
they stand on diﬀ erent sides of the secular-Islamic 
divide, but because they appeal to slightly diﬀ erent 
kinds of sensibility. Both the real person Mustafa 
and the literary fi gure Jim Nolan search for a way 
to feel alive, to do something meaningful, to have 
a basis and direction of life. But while the com-
munist creed that provides the sense of existential 
hope on the pages of In Dubious Battle is oriented 
toward a struggle against someone, a search for 
vations feature very centrally. One is the search 
for a solution to a personal crisis; the other is the 
desire to fi nd something truly important to pur-
sue in a way that gives one’s life a single and per-
manent purpose. Both appear to be quite general 
human pursuits, and yet neither of the two is very 
typical of everyday human experience, in which 
there are usually several important purposes in 
life.
To understand what these activists are after, it is 
therefore important to ask why, on what grounds 
and with what expectations some people embark on 
the search for dedicated perfection while others do 
not, and why some go on while others stop after a 
while. Muslims do not simply want to be good Mus-
lims. Neither the will to be pious, nor the choice 
for piety rather than other forms of activism is ob-
vious. Strikingly, many of those who join the Sala-
fi  movement do so because the ritual and moral 
rigour of Salafi sm promises order in a confusing 
life. At other times or in other contexts, they might 
have joined other religious or political groups, but 
for similar reasons. The questions I fi nd worth as-
king, then, are: What makes a specifi c direction 
of activism attractive in a specifi c situation? What 
are the anxieties people try to overcome and what 
are the promises they are oﬀ ered? What does their 
actual work of dedication look like? What conse-
quences does it have? How do the experiments of 
activist dedication, which are often temporary, be-
come a part of people’s biographies?
To pursue these questions, it is helpful to be open 
to both the generally human, the historically and 
culturally specifi c and the individually idiosyncra-
tic. For the sake of illustration, take the account of 
Mustafa, who became a dedicated Salafi  in his early 
twenties after experiencing a period of strong diso-
rientation, but stopped after less than a year. Today, 
he looks back at his Salafi  period with a mixture of 
fondness, distance and regret. He remembers his 
short period of dedicated piety as a happy time, but 
is neither willing nor able to return to it.
To understand Mustafa’s story, it is important 
but not suﬃ  cient to look at Salafi  Islam’s suc-
cess in northern Egypt in establishing itself as 
the most powerful religious voice and therefore 
Mustafa’s likeliest choice in the search for a clear 
diﬀ erence between right and wrong. Having cho-
sen the Salafi  path, Mustafa’s dedication took a 
specifi c direction with emphasis on gender segre-
gation, abstinence from alcohol, drugs and ciga-
rettes and viewing life as the application of divi-
ne Law. This had very specifi c consequences for 
the way he dealt with his mother and some of his 
friends, for example. But the emotional work this 
experiment did for him was also of a more general 
nature: Mustafa later compared it to me with his 
time in the army, which, he said, similarly provi-
ded him the clear structure he was missing. To 
understand his account, we therefore also need to 
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perfection external to daily life and to the existen-
tial signifi cance of the everyday, such grand sche-
mes can never be accounted for alone. They must 
always be understood as connected in at least two 
dimensions: fi rst, in their relation to everyday con-
cerns and experiences; and second, in their rela-
tion to other compelling grand schemes that also 
promise to provide meaning and direction to those 
everyday concerns and experiences.
In the case of my fi eldwork in Egypt, such grand 
schemes include commitment to Islam, romantic 
love, capitalist wealth and consumption, education 
and social mobility, development and modernisa-
tion and nationalist, pan-Arabic and pan-Islamist 
politics, to name just a few. This is not to say that 
the promise of good life and eternal salvation (with 
the converse threat of eternal damnation) that is 
central to people’s adherence to Islam today is no 
diﬀ erent from romantic love or from social mobi-
lity. It is very diﬀ erent, and herein lies its appeal 
and its power. But the ways people »live Islam«, as 
Magnus Marsden (2005) has put it, may not be so 
dramatically diﬀ erent from the ways they live ca-
pitalism and love. In all these cases, we are talking 
about great hopes, deep anxieties and compelling 
promises about grand schemes and powerful per-
sons that will lead to practical solutions, promises 
that people try to follow and to put in practice. Some 
do it more consistently than others. Some attempts 
actually help people to live a better life as they un-
derstand it. Others result in tragedy. Most are am-
bivalent, providing both satisfaction and suﬀ ering. 
Many attempts are short-lived, and almost all of 
them are partial. In all cases, the grand schemes 
are forever unrealised, and yet always apparently 
within reach, promising a hold, a direction in a dif-
fi cult, complex and often frustrating life. Looking 
at these attempts and their consequences with an 
eye for the richness and the openness, but also the 
limitations and power relationships of the human 
condition is in my view the most promising way 
to understand the signifi cance of the adherence to 
Islam as a part of human lives.
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